Estonian Economy and Economic Policy during the Economic Crisis by Raju, Olev
185 
ESTONIAN ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC POLICY DURING THE 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
Olev Raju 
University of Tartu 
 
Abstract 
 
Estonia suffered the deepest economic crisis of its history in 2007-2010; also, the 
crisis was one of the most troublesome ones among the member states of EU. The 
paper deals with main indicators describing the size and dynamics of the crisis and 
with  the  economic  politics  of  government  in  the  period.  The  latter  one  can  be 
characterized by delay in giving estimation to economic processes and the lack of 
means against the crisis. At the same time government erected task to join euro at any 
price. The economic reactions were centred on it. The taxis were increased and the 
expenditures were cut down in order to balance the budget at the highest peak of the 
crisis, it was done also in the middle of the budget year. All the criteria to join euro 
were succeeded to fulfil for a certain period (today the inflation is much higher again), 
but the difficulties of the crisis were magnified. The paper doesn’t give prognosis for 
the development of EC, euro, and Estonian economy in euro zone; neither does it give 
any variances of economic politics for next years.  
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Problem erection 
 
The deepest economic crisis of Estonian history began in 2007. I don’t want to argue 
whether the crisis in Estonia and EC is finally over or not; the purpose is to assert the 
fact that it’s severe results in economic would be felt  for  years. It’s didactical to 
analyse the course of the crisis and to observe, which economic political measures and 
when were taken at the time of the crisis and which were their results. An analyse of 
that kind gives good assumptions for coping with new crises.  
 
The analysis didn’t attempt to find any formulas from specialized literature as firstly, 
according to our knowledge there aren’t any generally accepted ones, and secondly, 
the specific situation of Estonia (and Latvia and Lithuania) doesn’t give the possibility 
to use many methods and formulas, suitable for usage in world, for the analysis of 
economic processes with sufficient accuracy. Also, the author didn’t try to construct 
his own theory or formulas. The analysis has been performed on the basis of classical 
and widely spread methods of research. 
 
The paper is of a mildly unusual structure due to the above mentioned reasons. Instead 
of  usual  theoretical  initial  part  and  consequent  practical  part  it  begins  with  the 
description  of  the  situation,  which  is  followed  by  the  observation  of  concrete 
economic  political  steps.  The  theoretical  treatment  of  each  concrete  economic 186 
political reaction (if it has been considered to be necessary) has been given together 
with the analysis of its practical usage.  
 
All the data before 2011 are given in Estonian kroons (EEK) as this was the currency 
of Estonia in the period. Kroon was fixed with euro (1 Euro = 15.6466 kroons). 
 
Extent of crisis 
 
In order to understand the extent of economic crisis of 2007 (or 2008) - 2010 in 
Estonia we’ll bring out its main features and compare them with the other EU states. 
 
The  economic  crisis  is  above  all  characterized  by  two  main  characteristics:  its 
duration and its deepness. All the other features are considered less important; also, 
their use or disuse depends also on specificity of concrete crisis. The data have been 
demonstrated in table 1.  
 
Economic depression (and other negative phenomena) of Estonia turned out to be 
enormous and exceeded greatly the average ones of EU. The decrease of GNP (2008 - 
5.1%; 2009 -13.9% and in the 1
st quarter of 2010 it was still -2.6%) was the biggest 
with the exception of Latvia and it was mildly less than in Lithuania. The decrease of 
other states has been considerably smaller (the biggest in Ireland in 2008 - 3.5% and 
2009 - 7.6%). But the best states as Poland have all the time been in positive balance. 
(Eurostat…) 
 
The decrease is going on in Greece, but its sum was however less than in Estonia as 
from 01. January, 2012 not to say nothing about the average decrease of EU (-4.2%). 
The best states, as Poland, have always been in positive field. 
 
The severity of the crisis is characterized by unemployment, too. The states of highest 
rate of unemployment were Latvia (17.1%), Estonia (13.8%) and Lithuania (13.7%) in 
2009; the average unemployment of EU was 8.9%. The situation has become more 
confusing since 2010 – the tendencies coming from financial problems of Greece etc. 
have been added to the tendencies of EU labour market coming from the economic 
cycle. The average unemployment of EU was 10.0% in 2010. Greece (17.9%) has 
been added to the list of states of highest rate of unemployment – Lithuania (18.3%), 
Latvia  (18.2%)  and  Estonia  (16.2%).  The  last  data  of  unemployment  (September 
2011) demonstrate that the states of crisis have begun to recover; the unemployment is 
higher in the states, which have got financial problems (average of EU 9.8%, Spain 
22.5%, Greece 18.8%, Portugal 12.8%, Lithuania 15.1%, Latvia 14.8% and Estonia 
11.3%). It should be added that unemployment of some states (for example, Germany) 
didn’t arise during the crisis (Eurostat…). 187 
Table 1. Dynamics of tax funds, wages, unemployment and GDP in 2007-2012 (per 
cents in comparison with the same quarter of the last year) 
Period  2007           2008          
   I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV 
 GDP  9,8  7,6  6,4  4,5  0.4  -1.4  -3.3  -9.9 
Tax revenues  27.6  28,4  18,6  18,2  10,2  5,7  7,1  -2.8 
Average wage  20,1  21,2  12,9  20,2  19,5  15,2  14,4  6,9 
Unemployment (%)  4,0  3,9  4,1  4,1  4,2  4,0  6,2  7,6 
Period  2009        2010       
   I  II  III  IV  I  I I  III  IV 
 GDP  -15.1  -16.5  -15.6  -9,7  -2,4  1,7  3,1  6,2 
Tax revenues  -10.1  -12.1  -13.6  -10,9  5,7  -2,2  -1,0  2,2 
Average wage  -1.5  -4.4  -5.9  -4,9  -2,3  -1,7  -0,7  3,9 
Unemployment (%)  11,4  13,5  14,4  15,5  19,8  18,6  15,5  13,6 
Period  2011        2012       
  I  II  III  IV  year       
GDP  11,4  12,7  9,8  4,0  2,0       
Tax revenues  1,6  9,8  5,9  3,9  7,5       
Average wage  4,4  4,2  6,5  4,1  4,4       
Unemployment (%)  11,4  12,7  9,8  11,0  11,2       
Source: Homepage of Ministry of Finance. http://www.ee/index.php?id = 233; 
Eurostat…. 
 
The deepness of the crisis is characterized by the duration of economic depression, 
which  approved  to  be  long.  Today  we  can  suggest  that  the  growth  of  GDP  was 
negative  in  Estonia during  9  quarters  but  in  most  of  the  states  of  EU  it  was 4-6 
quarters. Estonia will be stroke by Latvia (10 quarters) and probably Greece, wherein 
the decrease began later and where the increase can’t still be seen (indeed, the reason 
of decrease in Greece was another). As about reaching the level, which was before the 
crisis, probably GDP of the period would be reached in 4-5 years and to reach the 
previous rate of employment would probably took more time in Estonia. Anyway, 
according to the data we’ve got no one serious source has dared to predict the latter 
number. 
 
The deepness of the economic crisis could be well characterized by the comparison of 
the main data with the previous crises, particularly with Great Depression of 1929-188 
1932.  The  statistics  of  Estonia was  different  in  that  period  from  the  present  one. 
Therefore I won’t like to take it as absolutistic, but the differences are so great that 
they speak by themselves. The data from sources, which aren’t the most solid ones, 
confirm  that  gross  production  of  Estonia  decreased  by  about  5%.  Agricultural 
production, which was especially important in the period, even grew (Depression..., 
2007). However, the difference with the summary minus of GDP 23% is great. At that 
time maximal amount of unemployed was suggested to be 16 000 (NB! Not 160 000). 
The difference with the amount of unemployed now is rather great; also, these tens of 
thousands of people, who are looking for job abroad, should be added. If even to 
consider the dominant farming of that period, the picture wouldn’t be in favour of 
present crisis. Also, the duration of crisis was shorter. Estonia could overcome it in 
less than 1.5 year due to vigorous means of government. Exact statistics, which could 
give the data with accuracy of quarters, was impossible to find from the period. But 
the information of newspapers allows suggesting surely that it lasted no more than 5 
quarters. The conclusion could be only one – the economic crisis of the last years was 
the deepest of all the history. 
 
Economic policy during the crisis period 
 
The deepness of the economic crisis in Estonia in 2007 (2008?) – 2010 is obvious 
from mentioned above. It’s clear that state had to arrange its economic policy due to 
the crisis. 
 
The states usually take reactions during the periods of crisis, which could be divided 
into  two  groups:  enlivening  of  the  economics  and  assurance  of  its  own  financial 
capacity. The efficiency of the reactions is the bigger, the timely they have been taken 
and  the  closer  they  have  been  directed  to  concrete  state  and  to  overcoming  the 
bottlenecks of the situation (reasons) of concrete economic crisis (as crises differ by 
themselves).  
 
Estonia has been governed basically by the same government from March 2007. The 
economic political principles of the government are given in the clearest way in the 
budget strategy of state, which is published in II quarter of each year. Let’s observe 
them more closely. (Table 2)  
 
The first of them was taken on 19. April 2007. It’s directly gone from the euphoria of 
especially rapid economic growth of previous years (growth of GDP in 2005 – 10.5%; 
in 2006 - 11.4%; Riigi…., 2007) and from total ignoring the signs of danger obvious 
already from 2006. The government aims on a task to precede the especially rapid 
growth of economics (the growth of GDP in an average 7.5% in a year since 2011 to 
preserve the unemployment at the level of 4.4%). The prognosis of the income of state 
budget is especially optimistic – it should be 109.2 billion kroons (the real one was 
84.5 billon kroons and taxes formed 63.4 billion kroons from it). GDP, which had to 
reach up to 216.6 billion kroons since 2010 in current prices, was really 142.5 billion 
kroons. 
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Table 2. Basic prognosis of government economic strategy and their comparison with 
the reality 2007-2012 
  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
GDP             
Forecast in 2007  9,2  8,3  7,7  7,5  7,4  - 
Forecast in 2008  -  3,7  6,4  6,8  6,5  6,3 
Forecast in 2009  -  -  -8,1  -3,5  2,9  5,4 
Forecast in 2010  -  -  -  1,0  4,0  4,2 
Forecast in 2011  .  -  -  -  4,0  4,0 
Real  6,9  -5,1  -13,9  2,4  8,1  - 
Unemployment             
Forecast in 2007  4,8  4,3  4,4  4,4  4,4  - 
Forecast in 2008  -  4,3  5,1  5,5  5,5  5,3 
Forecast in 2009  -  -  12,2  15,6  15,4  13,5 
Forecast in 2010  -  -  -  15,5  13,9  11,9 
Forecast 2011  -  -  -  -  13,5  11,4 
Real  4,7  5,5  13,8  17,2  10,9  - 
Inflation (CPI)             
Forecast in 2007  4,9  5,2  4,4  3,6  3,3  - 
Forecast in 2008  -  9,0  5,3  3,6  3,5  3,4 
Forecast in 2009  -  -  0,4  -0,6  1,3  2,2 
Forecast in 2010  -  -  -  1,1  2,0  2,4 
Forecast in 2011  -  -  -  -  4,5  2,8 
Real  6,7  10,6  0,2  0,7  5,0  - 
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of State budget strategies of 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010 and 2011. The reality data are from Eurostat… 
 
There  isn’t  anything  strange  that  on  the  basis  of  such  a  supreme  optimism  that 
spontaneous continuation of the development of economic politics is relied upon. So, 
the strategic part of economic politics was too general containing just some principle 
economic  slogans  as  innovation,  growth  for  the  demand  for  tourism  products, 
economic environment favouring entrepreneurship, macroeconomic stability, taxation 
politics  stability  etc.  in  addition  to  universal  slogans  as  the  growth  of  social 
connectedness, care for children, good education, wealth of people etc. 
 
The next programme of government’s economic strategy is from May 2008. First of 
all,  the  concrete  numbers  have  been  mildly  decreased  in  connection  with  already 
deeply functioning economic crisis. (The growth of GDP was already negative in the 
second quarter of 2008.) The numbers (GDP +6.4%; unemployment 5.1%) predicted 
for  2009  by  government  are  supreme  optimistic  and  probably  originate  from 
inadequate perceiving of arising crisis situation on the basis of the real situation. As 
the  crisis  situation  hasn’t  been  perceived,  so  the  reactions  absent;  the  economic 
political programme repeats mostly the previous one. But there has become a new 
one: transition to euro. Estonia has fulfilled 2 conditions from necessary 5 for it – 190 
stability of currency (Currency board system had ensured it since 1992) and low level 
of  national  debt  (the  lowest  in  Europe!).  The  decrease  of  inflation  under  the 
conditions of high growth of unemployment and salaries to be cut down could be 
predicted at least temporarily. The interests of long-term credits are calculated on the 
basis of public sector bills. Their level was higher than it was stated in Maastricht 
agreement. As about the balance of budget, in spite of the fact that it’s already a great 
problem (in the same summer of 2008 government had to make negative additional 
budget) it isn’t reflected in economic strategic programmes in May yet. A surplus of 
budget  in  the  amount  of  1%  is  talked  about  (Riigi…,  2008).  Any  extraordinary 
reactions  for  budget  balancing  aren’t  certainly  planned  if  there  is  1%  surplus 
programme.  
 
The economic strategy of government from May 2009 is certainly of other style. Year 
2008 finished in spite of a negative additional budget with a consolidated deficiency 
of budget 7.3 billion kroons; GDP had been negative since the second quarter of 2008. 
The  minus  of  GDP  growth  had  already  reached  15.1%  in  first  quarter  of  2009. 
Certainly, the economic strategy of last years was impossible to proceed under such 
conditions. As the same government proceeded, so it had only two possibilities – to 
recognize  the  mistakes of  prognosis for  2  last  years and  its supreme  optimism  in 
economic political prognoses or to call attention aside. Government chose the second 
way under the conditions of forthcoming elections. Transition to euro was proclaimed 
to  be  purpose  number  one  and  all  economic  politics  was  subjected  to  it  (Riigi..., 
2009). Estonia had difficulties in fulfilling two conditions as it was explained above – 
interests of long-term credits and balance of budget. Government didn’t announce it 
anywhere (the reaction isn’t mentioned in strategy or in explanatory note of budget) 
but  used  the  circumstances  that  they  weren’t  very  great  and  just  redeemed  them. 
Hence the criterion succeeded to be fulfilled, at least formally. That’s a matter for 
itself what’s the macroeconomic influence of the reduction of such an enormous mass 
of money at the highest peak of crisis. A slogan was erected in order to fulfil the 
criterion  of  budget  balance  –  budget  gap  mustn’t  be  bigger  than  2.9%  of  GDP. 
Essential retrenchment of state expenses and lifting of taxes were necessary for its 
realization.  Retrenchment  of  expenses  was  carried  through  direct  retrenchment  of 
state expenses (additional payments to retirement funds were temporarily stopped, 
budgets  of  local  municipalities were  decreased,  salaries  were  cut  down  etc.).  Tax 
increase was used in taxation politics: value-added tax (named VAT in Estonia) was 
increased (the reduced level of 5% was increased to 9% from 1. January 2009; the list 
of reduced tax goods was limited; VAT ordinary level was increased from 18% to 
20%  from  1.  July  2009).  The  excises  were  essentially  increased  and  income  tax 
incentives were reduced. (Riigi..., 2009). As a result of enormous efforts the state 
budget gap was held under 3% of GDP and Estonia joined euro 1. January 2011. The 
question is what the macroeconomic influence of these reactions is. 
 
The  proportion  of  real  economic  results  and  predictions  has  been  changed  since 
publishing the budget strategy in May 2010. The real results corresponded more or 
less the predictions published in May of the same year; they were even a little better 
from it. Probably the difference of optimistic predictions and weak real results of last 
3 years had made the compilers of the predictions more realistic, not to say more 191 
careful. As the real results of 2010 corresponded more or less the predictions of May 
2010, the deviations of 2011 were already bigger. The real results of 2011 are much 
better than the predictions of 2010 or 2011; the inflation was just higher.  
 
As super optimism prevailed in predictions of 2007-2009, so calculable reversible 
deviations between the prediction and real data could be recognized in last two years. 
If  one  would  add  the  fact  that  any  concrete  means  to  reach  the  predicted  results 
practically lack in the strategy, it would become obvious that government has just 
relied on self-correcting forces of market. But the forces act with different strength in 
different  phases  of  a  business  cycle.  It  hasn’t  been  considered,  that’s  why  the 
deviations between predictions and real numbers have been considerable. 
 
Estonian state budget income structure  
 
The  statement  that  the  impact  of  the  crises  on  public  finances  was  stronger  on 
expenditure than on the revenue side (Taxation, 2011 p.18) should have to be agreed. 
On  average,  from  2008  to  2009  (the  years,  wherein  the  crisis  was  obvious  most 
clearly  in  EU)  revenue  contraction  contributed  only  about  half  a  point  to  the 
worsening of the public deficit (graph1). 
 
Expenditure, in contrast, went up more, by around four points of GDP. Furthermore, 
while the expenditure-to-GDP ratio increased significantly in almost countries, the 
picture  on  the  revenue  side  was  much  more  contrasted:  in  about  one  fourth  of 
countries,  the drop  of  revenue  was significant,  approaching  2%  of  GDP  or  more, 
whereas more than one third of countries actually increased revenues, as a share of 
GDP.  This  shows that,  although  the  exit  strategic  for  the  crisis  had  foreseen  that 
consolidation would, is a rule, start only in 2010, not all countries waited until year to 
start consolidating on the revenue side.(Taxation, 2011.pp.16-23) There isn’t anything 
strange that on the basis of such a supreme optimism that spontaneous continuation of 
the  development  of  economic  politics  is  relied  upon.  So,  the  strategic  part  of 
economic politics was too general containing just some principle economic slogans as 
innovation,  growth  for  the  demand  for  tourism  products,  economic  environment 
favouring entrepreneurship, macroeconomic stability, taxation politics stability etc. in 
addition to universal slogans as the growth of social connectedness, care for children, 
good education, wealth of people etc. 
 
The next programme of government’s economic strategy is from May 2008. First of 
all,  the  concrete  numbers  have  been  mildly  decreased  in  connection  with  already 
deeply functioning economic crisis. (The growth of GDP was already negative in the 
second quarter of 2008.) The numbers (GDP +6.4%; unemployment 5.1%) predicted 
for  2009  by  government  are  supreme  optimistic  and  probably  originate  from 
inadequate perceiving of arising crisis situation on the basis of the real situation. As 
the  crisis  situation  hasn’t  been  perceived,  so  the  reactions  absent;  the  economic 
political programme repeats mostly the previous one. But there has become a new 
one: transition to euro. Estonia has fulfilled 2 conditions from necessary 5 for it – 
stability of currency (Currency board system had ensured it since 1992) and low level 
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Figure1. Changes in EU member net lending / net borrowing 2009 (Taxation…, 
2011, p.16). 
 
As it could be clearly seen from Figure 1 Estonia is essentially different from other 
EU states by its budget behaviour. Figure 2 demonstrates it more clearly.  
 
A question would arise what was so different in the situation of Estonia and why a 
strategy of budget and taxes, which was so different from the whole EU, was chosen. 
One of the reasons was the influence of the crisis on budget, which was essentially 
higher  than  the  average.  The  strong  influence  of  economic  crisis  on  budget  is 
connected first of all with the individuality of the structure of Estonian state budget. 
 
In the initial stage of its transition period, Estonia (like most other Eastern European 
countries) was in a unique position – it essentially lacked a taxation system, a vital 
instrument of economic policy,  which now needed to be constructed. In a perfect 
world, that would have meant building a system based on contemporary economic 
theory. Unfortunately Eastern European countries lacked pertinent knowledge, both in 
regard to taxation theory and the economic situation (an accurate description of the 
development phase and the processes). 
 
So  what  characterizes  the  Estonian  tax  system?  Its  characteristic  features  are  a 
relatively  low  tax  burden,  simplicity  bordering  on  primitiveness  (which  has 
significantly reduced the possibilities of using taxes as a control device of economy), 
a very high percentage of indirect and consumption taxes. 
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The  tax  burden  in  Estonia  has  been  33.7–35.1%  since  Estonia  joined  the  EU 
(Taxation…); the data are slightly different in various parts of the website). The tax 
burden ought to increase up to 36% as a result of the taxation lifting in accordance to 
the  economic  crisis  in  2010  (Seadus…,  2010,  pp.  12-27).  But  as  the  Ministry  of 
Finance of the Republic of Estonia has already decreased the prognosis of GDP in 
comparison with the time of state budget passing, so we can speak about tax burden of 
37%. Also, it’s lower than the EU average (41–42%). However, these numbers are not 
comparable. Estonian state budget includes social benefits tax, which has for many 
years been the greatest source of income for the state budget (Table 3). In most EU 
member states such a tax does not exist or is slight. When that is taken into account, 
the tax burden in Estonia appears to be about 26–28%. 
 
The  economic  crisis  has  brought  attention  to  the  issue  of  tax  structure.  Table  1 
presents taxes in Estonian state budget from 2005, i.e. after Estonia joined the EU. It 
is difficult to assess what is the percentage of indirect taxes in Estonian state budget. 
Indirect taxes clearly include VAT, excises and the customs tax. However, also the 
gambling tax has some features characteristic to indirect taxes, as it is not imposed on 
the revenues from economic activities but rather as a preventive lump-sum tax, i.e. 
before launching the slot machine etc. The tax sum is transferred by the manager of 
the gambling business in some way (e.g. by raising drink prices) to the actual bearer – 
the gambler, i.e. consumer. Accordingly this tax also has the incidence characteristic 
of indirect taxes and therefore it is more accurate to regard it as an indirect tax (at 
least when it is established in such a way as in Estonia). 
 
As far as we know, there is no other country that has social benefits tax in the form 
that it exists in Estonia. The tax is paid by the employer, but it is calculated based on 
the amount of money paid to the employee. That tax is meant only for pensions and 
healthcare, i.e. it functions largely as retirement and health insurance. Clearly, the 
defining criterion here is whether the employee’s salary would increase by the amount 
that  makes  up  the  social  benefits  tax  if  that  tax  was  abolished.  If  yes,  the  social 
benefits tax has enough characteristic features to regard it as an indirect tax; if not, the 
features of direct taxes probably prevail (the social benefits tax is the employer’s 
expenditure). As this question is impossible to answer properly, authors classify it 
arbitrarily, depending on their views, as either a direct or indirect tax. Eurostat has 
taken a „diplomatic” position and classifies that Estonian social tax as a labour tax, 
regarding it therefore as primarily a resource tax (Taxation…) but that is not entirely 
accurate  as  the  income  from  social  benefits  tax  is  allocated  for  certain  social 
expenditures. 
 
It is probably reasonable to bring out the percentage of indirect taxes in different 
versions, with social benefits tax included and not. In the first case, the percentage of 
indirect taxes has made up 75.3–87.8% of state budget revenues ever since Estonia 
joined the EU; in the latter case the percentage has been 41.1–53.6%. If we take the 
first approach, we arrive at what is clearly the biggest percentage of indirect taxes 
among EU member states; even with the second approach the result is well above EU 
average. 
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When  trying  to  determine  the  percentage  of  consumption  taxes  in  Estonian  state 
budget, we likewise have to face the question of how to classify some taxes that are 
different  from  those  in  other  countries.  Again  we  are  talking  mainly  about  social 
benefits tax. In the form that it exists in Estonia, it has been regarded as a tax on using 
one of the goods – labour – and hence as a resource tax. That, however, raises the 
question of whether it is a consumption tax. It is not the purpose of this study to 
discuss whether the multifunctional tax established during the transition period when 
there  was  no  economic-theoretical  knowledge  available  belongs  to  this  or  that 
category. Therefore – although the author does not share the opinion that the social 
benefits tax  as it  exists  in  Estonia is  a  consumption  tax  –  also  the  percentage  of 
consumption taxes has been given in two versions. 
 
The figures demonstrate a growing dominant of social taxes in Estonian state budget 
tax funds from 34.2% in 2004 to 44.4% in 2008.  
 
Table 3. Income from taxes in Estonian state budget 2005–2011(millions of kroons)  
 
2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
(euro) 
 Total taxes  53831  55208  67718  70396  63780  63299  4341 
Personal income tax  10911  3846  4786  4328  2419  3000  2029 
Corporate income tax  2365  3123  4083  4166  4010  3032  2011 
VAT  14021  18645  22304  20548  18809  19531  1339 
Excises  6424  7030  8195  8971  9818  10425  7170 
  excise on tobacco  1205  1208  1529  2519  2088  1794  1389 
  excise on alcohol  1838  2089  2314  2434  2590  2585  1786 
  excise on fuel  3363  3728  4353  4697  4870  4870  3150 
  excise on packaging  …  3  …  1  1  1  1 
Gambling tax  292  354  467  484  278  323  x 
Customs tax  347  401  549  508  307  373  x 
Social benefits tax  18392  21764  27268  31299  28084  26562  1801 
Other taxes  1079  45  66  92  55  62  x 
X - Not published yet 
Source:  the  author’s  calculations  based  on  the  Ministry  of  Finance  homepage, 
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Estonian state budget and economic crisis  
 
The economic crisis of 2008-2009 was directly reflected in the budgets of EU member 
states. But its range and course have been very different. As it has been mentioned 
above, it was especially sharply reflected in Estonian budget as the structure of the 
incomes of Estonian budget was (is) different from the others. The economic results 
were different compared with other member states of EU due to it and due to different 
economic-political  purposes  (accession  to  euro  was  put  on  the  first  place  not 
overcoming  the  economic  crisis  as  soon  as  possible  and  with  the  least  social 
recessions). The difference in the situation is clearly given on figure 2, where EU 
member states have been compared in the highest peak of the crisis in 2009. Figure 2 
demonstrates that Estonia together with the richest state of EU Luxembourg were the 
only  ones,  where  tax-to-GDP  ratio  essentially  increased.  It  originated  as from  the 
increase of taxes at the highest peak of crisis, so from the decrease of GDP, which 
finally led to the growth of total tax-to-GDP ratio. But unlike most of the states of EU 
it  didn’t  increase  the  incomes of  Estonian  government  enough  to  allow  sufficient 
expenditure  for  decreasing  the  social  stress  originating  from  the  crisis  and/or 
activating economics. (Figure 2) 
 
 
Figure 2. Changes in EC member government expenditures and in total tax ratio in 
2009 (Taxation…, 2011, p.18). 
 
The crisis, which began in 2008, froze the sums paid as wages in 2009 due to the 
unemployment and it led to the decrease of social taxes. It beat the state budget of the 
Republic of Estonia and essentially cut the amount of budget of 2010. Obviously, the 
incomes of budget, which base on consuming taxes, have got a great elasticity during 196 
the periods, wherein the incomes and consumption are rapidly growing, but a system 
of this kind has got a low floatage. (Table 3).  
 
The figures of Table 3 demonstrate once again that the tax funds react on GDP hangs 
with some lag time. The peculiarity of the state budget of the Republic of Estonia – a 
great proportion of consumption taxes – brings a peculiar fact: the tax funds are in 
correlation with the dynamics of wages (especially in 2008) rather than the dynamics 
of GDP. A smaller decrease of tax funds in comparison with the GDP ones in 2009 
has diversely been occurred from the lifting of tax burden (the growth of turnover 
taxes rate by  
 
 
Figure 3. Changes in EC member government expenditures and total tax ratio in 2009 
(Taxation…, 2011, p. 20). 
 
2 percentage points, the increase of excises, the purring of income tax benefits). The 
concrete influence of taxes lifting and the influence of prices elasticity on tax funds 
can’t be explained here. 
 
The comparison of figures 2 and 3 is of great interest. It can be concluded that 4% 
change in the expenditures of Estonian government and in total tax ratio in 2009 is 
half a result of the increase of taxes and half the result of the decrease of GDP. 
 
As  it  has  been  mentioned  above,  not  only  the  taxes  weren’t  increased,  but  the 
expenditures of budget were decreased in order to preserve the budget gap under 3% 
of  GDP; also, it was doni in the  middle of a budget  year by compiling so-called 
negative  budgets.  But  a  cutting  of  that  kind  reduces  the  consumption.  As  the 
consumption taxes form the main part of Estonian state budget, so a cutback of any 
description of the budget means the cutback of the next period’s incomes.  
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Let’s observe the influence of three negative supplementary budgets of Estonia on the 
incomes of the next periods. A cutback of budget expenses unavoidably results in 
decrease  of  the  budget  income  during  the  periods  to  come.  This  is  a  process  of 
multiple levels. First, the taxes will not be gained from budgetary purchases, wages 
paid from the state budget etc.  
 
However, people go to the market with the money originating from the budget, their 
purchases feed the private sector – bakers, weavers, tailors and so on. Also, the state 
gets taxes from their wages and VAT and excises from their purchases, so the process 
is repeated.  
 
In  the  case  of  negative  supplementary  budgets,  the  amount  of  money  spent  on 
consumption is reduced. The people and institutions that receive funds to finance their 
business from the state budget will, therefore, have less to spend and so less tax will 
be paid. The amount of money that reaches the second level is also reduced and the 
income of taxes will decrease even more.  
 
Since it is not possible to ascertain the structure of expenditures in the case of the 
second and upward levels, it is not possible to clearly bring out the effect of cutting 
the expenses on tax profit; visible is only the first level as a result of the so-called 
direct calculation.  
 
Also, it has to be considered that each budgetary monetary unit compiles annually 2.8 
turnovers on an average; it means that it returns in 2.8 times on an average. Certainly, 
the money spent for purchases from abroad doesn’t return at all; the social tax and 
income tax from salary return quickly; turnover tax and excises return while spending 
wages  etc.  Therefore  it’s  practical  to  divide  the  budget  expenses  into  four  major 
categories based on their economic content (Seadus Eesti…, 2009): 1) purchasing and 
renovating material and nonmaterial property (i.e. investments); 2) appropriations; 3) 
carrying costs; 4) other expenses.  
 
People  divide  their  available  income  into  two:  savings  and  consumption.  The 
proportion of savings among general income can be calculated by the sum of the 
savings and available income. In 2008, the average saving per person was 7, 9% from 
available income; in 2009 it was 9, 2%. Rest of the available income was spent on 
consumption. 
 
The next feature to demonstrate the expenses of state budget returning to the state is 
the proportion of employment expenses. In 2008 it was 13%. Since it has remained 
stable  enough  for  years,  the  same  percentage  has  been  shown  for  2009  as  well 
(Rahandusministeeriumi …, 2010).  
 
If one would originate from the abovementioned presumptions, it’s not difficult to 
calculate  the  decreases  of  re-contributions  due  to  negative  additional  budgets. 
According to the calculations of the author 3 negative additional budgets of 2008 and 
2009, which total amount was 12.4 billion kroons, decreased the incomes in budgets 
of future periods not less than in 7 billion kroons (Raju, 2011, p.63-65). If we also 198 
consider the fact that if the cuttings had not been made, the unemployment rate would 
have risen more slowly and the unemployment benefits, income supports and other 
similar payments would have been lower, we start to question whether the cuttings 
were really economically justified.  
 
Summary 
 
The following can be concluded from the above: 
1.  Economic depression took place in EU in 2008-2010; it hasn’t been finished in 
some states yet. The depression of Estonia was one of the deepest in EU amongst 
most of the economic characteristics; it was even deeper than during the Great 
Depression of 1929-1932. 
2.  Economic crisis demands from the states to correspond their economic politics 
with the changed conditions of administration. The economic politics carried on 
by  the  government  of  the  Republic  of  Estonia  is  made  public  in  a  document 
named  State  Budget  Strategy  (Riigi  Eelarvestrateegia)  annually  in  May.  The 
strategies of 2007 and 2008 demonstrate that government didn’t acknowledge the 
deepness  of  the  crisis  and  relied  upon  spontaneous  and  fast  recovery  of  the 
situation on the basis of the extremely fast growth of the years before the crisis. 
3.  The crisis was rather deep already in 2009. State Budget Strategy recognizes the 
presence of crisis but it takes the direction on fulfilling the demands for transition 
to euro, not on reactions to crisis. 
4.  The purpose of economic politics different from other EU states – not to fight 
economic crisis but assuredly to passage to euro on 1. January 2011 – caused a 
different taxation and loan policy from other EU states in the years of crisis.  
5.  Thereat the main difficulty was the assurance of the demand of budget balance 
under the conditions of economic depression. Taxes were increased at the highest 
peak  of  crisis  (VAT  and  excises;  cost-cutting  of  income  tax  incentives)  and 
budget incomes were cost-cut. This gave the possibility to hold the budget deficit 
lower than 3% of GDP, but worsened the overcoming of economic crisis.  
6.  State budget of Estonia decreased essentially under the conditions of crisis. The 
decrease of budget was bigger than it had to be proceeding from the extent of the 
crisis.  It  forced  government  to  establish  additional  negative  budgets  as  in  the 
centre of 2008, so in the centre of 2009. Great decrease of budget was essentially 
predisposed by particular structure of tax revenues of Estonian state budget. 
7.  Determining the percentage of indirect and consumption taxes in the whole tax 
burden  is  complicated  as  there  is  no  generally  accepted  method  for  it.  Also, 
several of the taxes used in Estonia possess features characteristic of both direct 
and  indirect  taxes.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  clear  what  we  should  consider  a 
consumption tax – only those taxes that affect household consumption or also 
corporate ones in case the tax is imposed on final consumption. 
8.  Whichever approach we take to defining indirect and direct taxing, it is clear that 
indirect  taxes  prevail  in  the  income  of  the  Estonian  state  budget.  The  social 
benefits tax makes up a particularly big – and growing – proportion. Different 
approaches  lead  to  the  same  conclusion:  the  percentage  of  consumption  and 
indirect taxes in the state budget is equal, i.e. indirect taxes have been imposed on 
consumption. 199 
9.  The structure of the revenues of the Estonian state budget differs considerably 
from that of other EU member states. The percentage of environment taxes is 
negligible, while the peculiarly structured social benefits tax, which constitutes 
the greatest and increasing source of revenue of the state budget, is difficult to 
classify as either a direct, indirect or labour tax. Due to the huge proportion of 
consumption taxes the buoyancy of Estonian tax system is weak. The provisional 
conclusions  of  2008  demonstrate  clearly  that  during  periods  of  economic 
recession the state budget is very vulnerable. 
10. The shortfall of income to the state budget in 2008 and especially in 2009 has 
forced the government to make cutbacks up to 10% and has acutely raised the 
issue of increasing the tax burden. As the tax burden in Estonia is substantially 
lower than the EU average, it is possible. However, that raises the question of the 
optimal tax burden. Based on Slutsky’s principle of compensated demand curve 
and Ramsey’s optimal tax theory we can take the optimal level of indirect taxes 
(which  are  dominant  in  Estonia)  to  be the  point  where  the  household  welfare 
reduction curve and the social welfare increase curve intersect. 
11. The way Estonian Government has chosen to balance the budget – a continuous 
cut of the expenses- forms a dead circle as the cur of the expenses, particularly the 
wages, is going to decrease the incomes of the next period. According to the most 
modest calculations, which haven’t taken into consideration the decrease of the 
demand  due  to  macroeconomic  influence,  the  state budget  of  Estonia lost  2.2 
billion kroons in 2008 and 10.5 billion kroons in 2009 due to the cuts of the 
budget.  
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